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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

:

FRANCISCO A. CANDEDO,

:

Defendant/Petitioner.

:

Case No. 20080183-SC

INTRODUCTION
This Court should reverse because the imposition of a nine-year probationary
period violated Candcdo's right to due process. The legislatively-stated purpose of
probation in Utah is not restitution. It is rehabilitation. And Utah's probation statute is
not rationally related to achieving rehabilitation because it allows probation to extend far
beyond the time in which rehabilitation occurs. Sec infra Part I.
This Court should reach Candcdo's due process claim through rule 22(c) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Candedo does not invoke rule 22(c) to challenge his
underlying conviction. Rather, he asks this Court to determine whether his 108-month
probationary term is illegal because it violates substantive due process. This issue is
within the "sweeping" bounds that this Court has set for rule 22(c). See infra Part II.
Alternatively, this Court should reach Candcdo's due process claim through the
exceptional circumstances doctrine. At sentencing, Candedo relied on controlling
precedent that said Utah's probation statute limits probationary terms to 12 or 36 months.

Candedo could not predict that this Court would overrule that precedent in Wallace and
reinterpret the probation statute to allow limitless probation. Thus, denying him the
opportunity to challenge the legality of the probationary order under the new landscape
created by Wallace would result in manifest injustice. See infra Part III.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE
IMPOSITION OE A NINE-YEAR PROBATIONARY PERIOD
VIOLATED CANDEDO'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

First, Candedo challenges the trial court's decision to impose a 108-month
probationary period. This was the trial court's final judgment and is the order before this
Court for review. Thus, this Court should decide Candedo's due process claim based on
the trial court's final judgment and not on possible decisions that the trial court might
make in the future. Sec infra Part FA.
Second. Candedo was selected as a young or unhardencd criminal likely to be
rehabilitated. Having qualified for probation, therefore, he has the right to a fair, nonarbitrary sentence. In other words, he has the right to regain his liberty when his
probationary term is no longer rationally related to rehabilitation. See infra Part FB.
Third, for the reasons stated in Candedo's opening brief, the right implicated in
this case is likely a fundamental right. Sice PeFr Br. at 25-31. Accordingly, this Court
should apply a heightened degree of scrutiny. See icL This Court need not determine
whether Candedo's claim implicates a fundamental right, however, because as explained
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in section I.C., Candcdo's nine-year probationary period is not rationally related to the
legislatively-stated purpose of Utah's probation statute. See supra Part I.C.
A.

This Court Should Review the Trial Court's Final Judgment, Not Orders that
the Trial Court Might Make In the Future.
Candedo challenges the trial court's final judgment, lie argues that the trial court

violated due process when it ordered him to serve a 108-month probationary term. S^c
Pct'r Br. at 1-2, 7-31. Whether the trial court will ultimately terminate Candcdo's
probation early is a separate question that is not before this Court. See id. at Add. B
(Order dated July 11, 2008); but see Resp't Br. at 26-27.
Besides, given the trial court's reasoning below, it is unlikely that it will terminate
Candcdo's probation early. The trial court imposed the 108-month probationary period
for purposes of restitution, not rehabilitation. Sec R. 270:34-35; Resp't Br. at 36 (stating
probationary purpose "in this case" is "victim restitution"). Because Candedo owes a
large amount of restitution, it is unlikely that he will be able to pay it in 108 months. Sec
R. 265:3 (computing restitution at $3,373,060). Thus, assuming it is at all possible to
predict future orders of the court, it is likely that the trial court will use the statutory
authority defined by State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, 150 P.3d 540, to extend Candcdo's
probation until restitution is paid in full, even if no violations occur and even if it means
that Candedo will remain on probation for the rest of his life. S^e Wallace, 2006 UT 86
at 1| 13 (holding that "a court may terminate probcition for a felony at thirty-six months, or
it may terminate probation at any other time" (citation omitted)).

3

JS.

Having Been Selected as a Young or Unhardcncd Offender Likely to Be
Rehabilitated, Cancledo Has a Right to Regain His Liberty Once the Purposes
of Probation Are Complete.
A defendant docs not have a right to be put on probation. Sec Pct'r Br. at 27-28;

Rcsp't Br. at 31. And, if placed on probation, the defendant will lose some of his
constitutional rights. Sec Pct'r Br. at 28: Rcsp't Br. at 31; sec, e.g., In re A.C.C., 2002
U 1 22. *||26. 44 P.3d 708 (holding that trial court may ''restrict |a defendant's] expectation
of privacy to be free from random searches" while on probation).
But, when a defendant is selected as a "young or unhardcncd offender" likely to be
rehabilitated on probation, he docs not surrender his entire bundle of constitutional rights
by accepting the opportunity. Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272 (1943); sec,
e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984) (holding that defendant "does not
lose" the privilege against self-incrimination when he is on probation); A.C.C., 2002 UT
22 at *|[22 (holding probationer retains right to privacy, but his right "pales in comparison
to the privacy interest retained by citizens not on probation"); State v. Velasquez, 672
P.2d 1254. 1262 (Utah 1983) ("Although |probationers) have diminished Fourth
Amendment rights as to searches by [probation| officers, that does not mean that police
officers may engage in warrantless searches and seizures as to [probationers! on the same
basis as [probation] officers." (citations omitted)).
In particular, by accepting probation, the defendant does not surrender his right to
be treated fairly. Sec, e.g., United States v. Guagliardo, 278 l\3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding probationer has due process right to probation conditions that arc
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sufficiently clear to inform him of what conduct is prohibited); McVcy v. State, 863
N.E.2d 434, 447 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding trial court's discretion to set probation
conditions "is limited by the principle that the conditions imposed must be reasonably
related to the treatment of the defendant and the protection of public safety"); State v.
Orr, 2005 UT 92,1|33, 127 P.3d 1213 ('The fundamental fairness requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment forbids the revocation of probation when a probationer has failed
to pay restitution or a fine through no fault of his own." (citation omitted)); State v.
Cowdelf 626 P.2d 487, 488 (Utah 1981) (w6|l|n revoking a probation, a court may not
ignore fundamental precepts of fairness protected by the due process clause."); State v.
Kichlcr. 483 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1971) (recognizing that "fairness and the effective use
of probation demand that a defendant who is placed on probation should have the
assurance that if he keeps the conditions of his probation it will continue, as contrasted
with having to live in dread of revocation merely on someone's whim or caprice").
A fair probationary sentence is one that docs not arbitrarily extend probation
beyond the time it is useful to achieving the purpose of probation. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (saying, regarding commitment to a mental institution, that
"[a|l the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear
some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed"); Jones v.
United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983) ("The purpose of commitment following an
insanity acquittal, like that of civil commitment, is to treat the individual's mental illness
and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness. The committed acquittce
is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous."); State
5

v. Orr, 2005 UT 92, HIT 12, 13, 16, 127 P.3d 1213 (holding that probation extension
proceedings must meet "the 'minimum requirements of due process'" even though they
do not deal with '"the immediate, "grievous loss of liberty implicated in a revocation of
probation/ but instead with a mere continuation of probationary restrictions and the
'possibility of future revocation'" (citation omitted)).
In Utah, the purpose of probation is rehabilitation. Sec supra Part I.C.; Pct'r Br. at
9-10, 27. At the time that the trial court places a defendant on probation, it is not certain
that he will be rehabilitated. Sec Resp't Br. at 36. But within a relatively short period of
time--research shows "within five years"—it will become certain. United States v.
Albano, 698 F.2d 144, 149(2dCir. 1983) (citations omitted); see Pet'r Br. at 29
(additional citations). If the defendant has not been rehabilitated within five years, it is
very unlikely that he is going to be. Sec rd. Accordingly, at that point, it is appropriate
for the trial court to hold a hearing and, based upon a finding that the probationer violated
a condition of his probation, modify, extend, or revoke probation. Sec Utah Code Ann. §
77-1 8-1(12) (Supp. 2005). If the defendant has been rehabilitated, however, then
continuing him on probation for a lengthy or even indefinite period of lime docs not serve
rehabilitation. !Scc supra Part l . C ; Pet'r Br, at 11-15. fo the contrary, it undermines the
rehabilitation already achieved. See id.
Accordingly, Utah's probation statute implicates a due process liberty interest
because it authorizes a trial court to arbitrarily impose any length of probation regardless
of whether it is rationally related to achieving rehabilitation. Sec Utah Code Ann. §7718-l(10)(a)(i); Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at W 1-13 (holding that Utah's probation statute
6

"does not impose any limitation on the length of probationary term that a court may
impose"); supra Part I.C.; Pct'r Br. at 9-31. This Court should not disregard the due
process violation simply because the defendant could have elected to be incarcerated if he
did not like the arbitrary probation terms set by the trial court. Sec RcspT Br. at 31-32.
To the contrary, this Court should recognize a probationer's right to regain his liberty
once the purposes of probation are complete and, as explained in section I.C., reverse
because Candcdo's nine-year probationary term exceeds the limits of constitutionality.
C.

Candedo's Nine-Year Probationary Period Is Not Rationally Related to the
Legislatively-Stated Purpose of Utah's Probation Statute.

Candcdo does not argue that this court "'misinterpreted the probation statute" in
Wallace. Resp't Br. at 46. Instead, Candcdo asks this Court to determine whether our
probation statute, as written, violates due process because it "docs not impose any
limitation on the length of probationary term that a court may impose." Wallace, 2006
UT 86 at ffi|l 1-13; sec PctT Br. at 7-31.
in Utah, the legislatively-stated purpose of probation is rehabilitation. See Utah
Code Ann. § 77-27-1(10) (2003) (defining probation as an "act of grace"); Pct'r Br. at 910 (additional citations); sec Resp't Br. at 39 (conceding that rehabilitation "is an
important and perhaps even the primary goal of probation").
The State has cited no authority to contradict this statement. !Sec RespT Br. at 39
(citing State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Rhodes. 818
P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). In Nuttall the court of appeals discussed
incarceration, not probation. Nuttall, 861 P.2d at 454. It concluded "that the state is not
7

prohibited from incarcerating an individual Tor purposes other than rehabilitation.'" Id
at 458 (citation omitted). "One of those 'other purposes' may be to protect society from
an individual deemed to be a danger to the community." ]d. (citation omitted).
Similarly, in Rhodes, the court of appeals discussed "factorjsj the trial court may
consider when making a sentencing determination/' not the statutory purposes of
probation. Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051. It held that "rehabilitation is not the only factor the
trial court may consider when making a sentencing determination. Other factors include
deterrence, punishment, restitution, and incapacitation." IcL (citation omitted).
Restitution, on the other hand, is not a legislatively-stated purpose of probation.
See Pet'r Br. at 22-25. In its brief, the State lists many statutes, but none of them say
restitution is a purpose of probation or authorize imposing "long-term probation to enable
a probationer to fulfill his restitution obligation." Rcsp't Br. at 40-42; sec Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-201(1 )(d) (Supp. 2008) (defining restitution); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(2)(c) (authorizing trial court to "sentence a person convicted of an offense . . . to
probation"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a) (requiring trial court, "in addition to any
other sentence it may impose." to "order that the defendant make restitution" if he "is
convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages"); Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-20l(4)(b) (wCIn determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall
follow the criteria and procedures as provided in . . . |thc| Crime Victims Restitution
Act"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(8)(ix) (Supp. 2005) ("While on probation, and as a
condition of probation, the court may require that the defendant. . . make restitution . . .
.**): Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-1(1) (2003) (declaring Legislature's "intent to ensure" that
8

victims' rights "are honored and protected by law"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-3(1 )(c)
(Supp. 2008) (granting victims the right to "seek restitution . . . as provided in . . . 7738a-302"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(2) (Supp. 2008) (requiring trial court to
•'determine complete restitution and court-ordered restitution"); Utah Code Ann. § 7738a-302(5)(c) (outlining how to calculate restitution).
In his opening brief Candcdo makes no statement as to whether "the Code
generally . . . limits probation extensions." Resp't Br. at 47; see Pcl'r Br. at 22-23.
Rather, to support his argument that restitution "is not a legislatively-stated goal of
probation in Utah," he notes that the Utah Code authorizes a trial court to "order the
defendant to pay restitution as a condition of probation," but not to extend "the
Among the factors to consider when calculating restitution, section 77-38a-302
lists "the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution
will impose, with regard to other obligations of the defendant," "the ability of the
defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other conditions to be fixed by
the court," and "the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution
and the method of payment." See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i)-(iii).
The State claims that the term "other conditions," as used in section 77-3 8a302(5)(c)(ii). "reasonably suggests an extended period of probation to accomplish a
burdensome restitution obligation." Resp't Br. at 42. This claim is unsupported by any
explanation or citation. Sec Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (stating briefs must contain
reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority); Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98,
<||7, 17 P.3d 1122 ("Failure to provide any analysis or legal authority constitutes
inadequate briefing." (citations omitted)): State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299. 305 (Utah
1998) (declaring issue inadequately briefed when the "overall analysis of the issue is so
lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court").
Moreover, this interpretation is contrary to the objective of the section, which is to
assess whether the defendant's circumstances "make restitution inappropriate." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(c)(iv); see Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037,
1045 (Utah 1991) ("If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the
provisions of an act. it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its
objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with its intent and purpose.").
As explained in the body of this section and in the opening brief, it is also contrary to the
language of the probation and restitution statutes. See supra Part I.C.; Pcl'r Br. at 19-25.
9

probationary period in order to enforce restitution." Pcl'r Br. at 22-23 (citing Utah Code
Ann. §§ 77-18-l(8)(a)(ix); 77-18-1(10)(a)(ii)(A); 77-38a-501(2)(b)).
The State correctly argues that section 77-38a-501(2)(b) (2003) applies only to
restitution "'regarding costs of incarceration in a county correctional facility." Utah Code
Ann. § 77-38a-501(2)(a); see Rcsp'l Br. at 48-49. Regardless, the remaining sections
cited by Candedo support his argument thai restitution is not a legislatively-stated goal of
probation in Utah and indicate that trial courts arc not authorized to extend probation in
order to enforce restitution. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-18-1 (8)(a)(ix); 77-18l(10)(a)(ii)(A): 77-38a-501 (1).
"While on probation, and as a condition of probation," a trial court may order a
defendant to "make restitution." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(8)(a)(ix) (Supp. 2005). "If,
upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection (10)(a)(i), there
remains" restitution to be paid, then the trial court "may retain jurisdiction of the case and
continue the defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the
payment of |restitution |." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(ii)(A). Additionally, a trial
court "may impose sanctions against the defendant" if he "defaults in the payment of a
judgment for restitution or any installment ordered/" Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-501(l).
When read in conjunction with the 12- or 36-month provision included in the
probation statute, sec Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10)(a)(i), these sections suggest that the
Legislature intended a short probationary term focused on rehabilitation followed by a
long period of bench probation, if necessary, for the limited purpose of enforcing the
remainder of the restitution order. Sec State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Utah Ct.
10

App. 1992) (Because u [tjhe legislature anticipated . . . situations where the court might. .
. decide upon a payment schedule for restitution which would extend beyond the
probation period," it "'provided a separate, limited source of jurisdiction by which the
court could recall a defendant and hold him or her accountable for full payment of
restitution."), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993); Pcl'r Br. at 19-22. Its failure to
enact language to codify this intent was the result of a drafting "defect" that left "the
provision regarding 36 months . . . nearly meaningless." Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at ^13;
sccPctTBr. at 19-22. 2
Thus, the Utah Code does not list restitution as a purpose of probation in Utah. It
makes sense, therefore, that the Utah cases cited by the State also do not rccogni/c
restitution as a goal of probation. !Sec RcspT Br. at 42-43 (citing Dickey, 841 P.2d at
1206-07; State v. Orr, 2005 UT 92, ^36, 127 P.3d 1213; State v. AllmendinRcr, 565 P.2d
1119, 1121 (Utah 1977)).
In Dickey, the court of appeals held that the "trial court had jurisdiction to enforce
its previous restitution order" after probation ended by continuing the defendant on bench
probation. Dickey, 841 P.2d at 1205. In reaching this decision, the court explained that

~ It is true that Utah, like many jurisdictions, allows a trial court to impose
restitution as a condition of probation. See Pct'r Br. at 15; Resp't Br. at 44 n.9. As
explained in Candedo\s opening brief, however, granting a trial court authority to make
restitution a condition of probation "while" a defendant is on probation docs not give a
trial court the much broader authority to keep the defendant on probation until restitution
is paid. Utah Code Ann. § 77-1 8-1 (8)(a)(ix); sec Dickey, 841 P.2d at 1205-09; Smith v.
Cook. 803 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah 1990) ("The trial court's power to grant, modify, or
revoke probation is purely statutory, and although a trial court has discretion in these
matters, the court's discretion must be exercised within the limits imposed by the
legislature.").
11

the Utah Code gives restitution a "separate purpose" from probation. Id. It also
"provide] s| independent guidelines for its computation and criteria for its scheduling,
mandatej s | a specific procedure for court enforcement, and expressly provide) s] for trial
courts' jurisdiction over the defendant until payment completion." IdL The
"mispcrception" thai restitution is not an "independent concept" from probation:
is fostered by the fact that provisions governing orders for both probation
and restitution are scattered throughout multiple subsections of the criminal
procedure statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-1 8-1; the two punishments arc
intertwined by making one a condition of the other, id_. at § 77-1 8-1(8): and
the timetables for each necessarily overlap.
Dickey, 841 P.2d at 1206. In sum, "although the timetables for restitution and probation
may overlap, the legislature has instructed courts to determine the length of each based
upon entirely different criteria." IcL at 1207.
Next, in Orr, this Court did not hold that a defendant's " o n l y incentive to continue
making restitution payments is to avoid his probation being revoked.'" Resp't Br. at 43
(quoting Orr, 2005 UT 92 at p 7 ) . To the contrary, this Court held that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by extending the defendant's probation when he "violated the
condition of his probation requiring him to pay restitution to his victims." Orr, 2005 UT
92 at *||36. As support for this decision, this Court noted that the trial court implicitly
found that the defendant acted willfully and that "other alternatives for punishing
[dcfcndanl| were inadequate" when it found that the defendant in that case was "'induced
to repay his victims only when he |was| in the shadow of probation and the threat of
incarceration [was] held over him.*" Id. at ^|36-37.
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Finally, in AUmendinger, this Court did not hold that restitution is a statutorilystated goal of probation. AUmendinger, 565 P.2d at 1120-21. Rather, it held that the trial
court had jurisdiction to revoke defendant's probation after the time that his six-month
jail sentence would have ended but before the one-year probationary term that he agreed
to serve ended. Id at 1121. When reviewing AUmendinger, it is important to note that
this Court was interpreting the original probation statute, which allowed a trial court to
"place the defendant on probation for such period of time as the court shall determine."
UL at 1120 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17 (U.C.A. 1953)). This version of the
statute was changed in 1984, when the Legislature added a 6- or 18-month limitation on
probation. Sec Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(10)(a) (Interim Supp. 1984). Moreover,
AUmendinger's holding has not been followed. Since it was published, AUmendinger has
only been cited twice—in Candcdo and Wallace—and only for the narrow proposition
that a defendant does "'not have to accept the terms of his probation/" but if he does, he
"'must abide by them.'" State v. Candcdo, 2008 UT App 4,1[8 n.6, 176 P.3d 459
(quoting Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at ^[19 (quoting AUmendinger, 565 P.2d at 1121)).3

1

After Wallace, Utah's probation statute again provides no "limitation on the
length of probationary term that a court may impose." Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at •JH] 11-13.
As explained in Candcdo's opening brief, however, this approach is only followed by
wC
|a| few jurisdictions" today. Wayne R. LaFavc et al., Criminal Procedure, § 26.9(a), at
862 (2007) (hereinafter LaFave, Criminal Procedure); sec PctT Br. at 17-19. The
majority of a |m|odern statutes" reject this approach as wTmwisc" because *c'|s|uch openended authority not only may subject the offender to a pointlessly extended jeopardy, but
it aggravates the caseload burden of the probation staff as well.*" LaFavc, Criminal
Procedure, §26.9(a), at 862 (citation omitted); sec Pct'r Br. at 4 n.3. Moreover, this
approach violates due process because it undermines the Legislature's stated legitimate
interest in rehabilitation by making the defendant feel like an outsider even after he is
13

In its brief, the State identifies three jurisdictions—Kansas, Kentucky, and
Maryland- -that "expressly provide! | for lengthy probationary periods to ensure payment
of restitution." Rcsp't Br. at 43 n.8. In his opening brief, Candedo identified Arizona as
another such jurisdiction. Pcf r Br. at 22 n.5. In all, therefore, the parties have located
(bur jurisdictions where restitution is a legislatively-stated purpose of probation/ See
Pcf r Br. at 22 n.5; Rcsp't Br. at 43 n.8. These jurisdictions clearly express their purpose
in their statutes and carefully define the expansion permitted. See id. Utah is not among
these jurisdictions. Sec Rcsp't Br. at 43 n.8.
The State also identifies one state -Maine - that, according to the State,
rccogni/cs restitution as a purpose of probation even though its statute does not expressly
state this purpose. Rcsp't Br. at 42 (citing State v. DadicRo, 617 A.2d 552, 553-55 (Me.
1992)). In Dadiego. the Supreme Judicial Court held that Maine's statute, as written,
allows probation terms to run consecutively. Dadiego, 617 A.2d at 554-55. In reaching
this decision, the Court noted that wC[c|onsccutivc terms of probation may . . . allow a
greater amount of restitution to be paid." IcL at 555. It did not, however, assess whether
restitution is a statutorily-stated purpose of probation in Maine and/or whether its statute

rehabilitated, adding to the overcrowding of prisons and jails, and diluting AP&P's
already meager resources. Sec Pct'r Br. at 9-25.
1 he State cites Delaware as a state whose statute permits a longer probationary
term to ensure the collection of any restitution ordered/" Rcsp't Br. at 35 n.5 (quoting
Del. Code Ann. tit. 1 K § 4333 (b), -(d)(3) (2008)). Like Utah, however, Delaware's
statute says that wCany period of probation" ordered "to ensure the collection of any
restitution" that exceeds the statutory limitation (generally "|o|nc year" and up to w'|t|\vo
years, for any violent felony") "shall be served" as bench probation. Id. at § 4333(b)(1)(3); (d)(3).
wCt
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violates due process. Id. at 553-55. Because it imposes a four-year statutory limit on
probationary terms, except in express situations, it is unlikely that Maine's statute has the
same constitutional difficulties as ours. Skx Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, §1202(1), (1A).(l-B)(2007).
Moreover, DadieRO is distinguishable because it involved consecutive
probationary terms. Dadicgo, 617 A.2d at 554-55. In this case, the trial court imposed
one long probationary term. Candcdo, 2008 UT App 4 at ^3. Plus, Utah's appellate
courts have not yet decided whether Utah's probation statute allows consecutive
probationary terms. See Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at *|[4 (declining to address "whether terms
of probation for multiple convictions may be imposed consecutively" because it was
unnecessary given the Court's "conclusion] that the Legislature has not limited terms of
probation to any particular time period"); Candcdo, 2008 UT App 4 at *\\4 (following
Wallace and deciding that it "need not consider whether" the trial court could impose
"consecutive probation periods where multiple crimes were committed").
Finally, the State lists several jurisdictions whose statutes leave probation ''entirely
in the court's discretion or permit probation to extend to the maximum sentence of
confinement authorized by statute." Wayne R. LaFavc ct al., Criminal Procedure, §
26.9(a), at 862 (2007) (hereinafter LaFavc, Criminal Procedure); see Rcsp't Br. at 35 n.5.
Hie State's list largely mirrors the list provided in Candedo's opening brief. Compare
Pct'r Br. at 17 n.4 with Rcsp't Br. at 35 n.5. liven including the additional citations
provided by the State, these statutes—particularly those like Utah's that do not limit
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probation even to the length of the allowable prison term-—represent the minority
approach. See Rcsp'l Br. at 35 n.5.
Tying "'the term of probation to the often lengthy authorized term of
imprisonment/' let alone allowing probation to continue beyond the authorized prison
term, is regarded as "unwise" and is not espoused by "|m|odern statutes." LaLave,
Criminal Procedure, §26.9(a). at 862; sec Pct'r Br. at 17-19. "Such open-ended authority
not only may subject the offender to a pointlessly extended jeopardy, but it aggravates the
caseload burden of the probation staff as well." kf (citation omitted). Moreover, at least
in Utah, this approach violates due process because it is not rationally related to our
Legislature's stated legitimate interest in rehabilitation. See Pct'r Br. at 9-25.
In sum, the statutorily-stated purpose of probation in Utah is rehabilitation.
Restitution, on the other hand, is statutorily excluded as a possible purpose of probation.
And the State has not identified any other purposes of probation contemplated by our
Legislature.^ As interpreted by Wallace, therefore, the probation statute violates due

5

To the extent that the Legislature may have contemplated other purposes—such
as public safety —these purposes are not at issue here. The trial court imposed the 108month probationary term because Candedo owed restitution, not because it was
concerned about public safety. R. 270:34-35; Rcsp'l Br. at 36 (stating probationary
purpose "in this case" is "victim restitution"). This makes sense because Candedo was
not convicted of a violent oflense. Sex R. 207-08; 219; 269:9. Further, to the extent that
our Legislature has identified public safety as a purpose of probation, it has statutorily
limited this purpose to specific offenses that do not apply here. Sec, e.g., Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-406.5(2) (Supp. 2008) (allowing probation periods in certain sexual offense
against a child cases "for up to a maximum often years"); State v. Pritchctt, 2003 UT 24,
^|30, 69 P.3d 1278 (purpose of probation under section 76-5-406.5 " c is to avoid
compounding the harm already suffered while protecting the victim from further abuse*"
(citation omitted)).
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process because it does not rationally further our Legislature's stated legitimate interest in
rehabilitation. Sec Pct'r Br. at 7-31. To the contrary, as explained in Candcdo's opening
brief, it actually undermines probation's rehabilitative goals by making a defendant feel
like an outsider even when he is rehabilitated, adding to the overcrowding of prisons and
jails, and diluting AP&P's already meager resources. See id. Thus, this Court should
reverse and remand for resentencing because the nine-year probationary term ordered in
Candcdo's case exceeds the limits of constitutionality.
IL

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT
CANDEDO'S DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT COULD NOT BE
RAISED UNDER RULE 22(c)

'The purpose of rule 22(e) is to allow correction of manifestly illegal sentences.'*
State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, «j|5, 48 P.3d 228; see Pct'r Br. at 31. Rule 22(c), however,
is not a rubherstamp that limits this Court to reversing an illegal sentence only if it has
previously addressed the issue and declared the sentence illegal. Resp't Br. at 14, 17. To
the contrary, it is a "sweeping" rule that allows this Court to '"correct an illegal sentence,
or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time.'" State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856,
858-60 (Utah 1995) (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c)).
"|A|n illegal sentence is void." Telford, 2002 UT 51 at *|J5. This means that
regardless of whether a court has previously determined the sentence is illegal, it is u [o]f
liven if the Legislature identified public safety as a purpose of probation, this
Court should still reverse because Utah's probation statute is not rationally related to
achieving public safety for the same reason that it is not rationally related to achieving
rehabilitation. Lengthy probationary terms undermine probation's rehabilitative goals by
making a defendant feel like an outsider even when he is rehabilitated, adding to the
overcrowding of prisons and jails, and diluting AP&P\s already meager resources. Sec
Pct'r Br. at 7-31. These results equally undermine public safety.
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no legal effect" and is "null" from its inception. Black's Law Dictionary, 1604 (8 1 ed.
2004); compare Black's Law Dictionary, 1605 (8 th ed. 2004) (defining "voidable" as
meaning "|v]alid until annulled"). Manifestly illegal sentences, therefore, arc not limited
to those sentences that "direct) ly] conflict with the express language" of "existing law."
RcspT Br. at 14, 17. Nor are they limited to those sentences that have been previously
adjudicated and declared illegal. Sec id.
In two cases cited by Candedo in his opening brief, this Court relied on "the
express language" of "existing" decisions, Resp't Br. at 14, to determine whether the
challenged sentence was illegal. Sec Telford, 2002 UT 51 at *\\3 (using rule 22(e) to reach
defendant\s claim that indeterminate sentencing violated Utah Constitution's separation
of powers clause but affirming because "|t]his court has already addressed and rejected"
defendant's contention in another case): State v. Iligginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 551 (Utah
1996) (remanding pursuant to rule 22(e) because prior case law determined that statute
"docs not authorize a consecutive, determinate two-year term as was given here"
(citations omitted)). In Telford, however, this Court stated that it may have been willing
to "depart from [its] established precedent" and conduct a new analysis under rule 22(c)
regarding the legality of Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme if defendant had
"provided" the necessary "basis." Telford, 2002 UT 51 at «,|3.
Further, in the other cases cited by Candedo, this Court and the court of appeals
conducted unique

and at times first impression —analyses to determine whether the

challenged sentence was illegal and required correction under rule 22(e). Sec State v.
S amor a, 2004 UT 79, f |jl3, 99 P.3d 858 (holding, as a matter of first impression in a case
18

where the court of appeals previously vacated a sentence under rule 22(c) because it
violated rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, that "a sentence imposed in
violation of rule 22(a) . . . may be considered a 'sentence imposed in an illegal manner'
under rule 22(c)"); Kuchncrt v. Turner, 499 P.2d 839, 840-41 (Utah 1975) (looking to
cases from other jurisdictions for guidance and holding, in an instance of first impression,
that a sentence is illegal if defendant "was without counsel," was not informed of his
right to counsel, and did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel at
sentencing); State v. Garner, 2008 UT App 32, ^ 1 8 , 20-25, 177 P.3d 637 (reviewing
"[defendant's claim that Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme violates his Sixth
Amendment rights" under rule 22(e) even though it is a matter of first impression and
"centers on recent United States Supreme Court Sixth Amendment jurisprudence"); State
v. Headley, 2002 UT App 58, 2002 WL 287890, * 1-3 (using rule 22(c) to reach
defendant's arguments that he received ineffective assistance at sentencing and that trial
court "relied on information in the presentence report that the court knew was false," but
rejecting claims because record is incomplete).
In this case. Candedo does not invoke rule 22(e) to challenge his underlying
conviction. Sec, e.g., State v. Nicholls, 2006 UT 76, ^[5, 148 P.3d 990 (declining to reach
defendant's argument because "substance of the appeal is . . . a challenge, not to the
sentence itself, but to the underlying conviction" (alteration in original) (citations
omitted)); Telford, 2002 UT 51 at ^[6-7 (same); State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, ^[2-3, 5, 40
P.3d 630 (same); State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ^[8, 994 P.2d 1243 (same); State v.
Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995) (same). Rather, he asks this Court to determine
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whether his 108-month probationary term is illegal because it violates substantive due
process. Sec Pet'r Br. at 1-2; Order dated July 11, 2008. This issue is within the
'"sweeping" bounds that this Court has set for rule 22(c). Brooks. 908 P.2d at 860; see
Telford, 2002 UT 51 at lfl|2-4 (invoking rule 22(c) to reach defendant's argument that
indeterminate sentencing violates Utah's due process clause). Thus, this Court should
reverse the court of appeals' decision and use rule 22(c) to address Candcdo's due
process claim on the merits.
HI.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT JUSTIFY
REACHING CAN DEPP'S DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT

If "exceptional circumstances exist," then this Court will reach the merits of an
unprcscrved issue. State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29,^[16, 94 P.3d 186. This
Court has never said that it will only apply the exceptional circumstances doctrine to
cases where the need to reverse is immediately apparent. See Resp't Br. at 23 n.2.
Rather, it has said that it will apply the exceptional circumstances doctrine wherever an
appellate court's "failure to consider an issue that was not properly preserved for appeal"
will result "in manifest injustice." Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29 at ^23.
In State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994), a case cited in the State's brief,
exceptional circumstances did not exist because the defendant's failure to preserve his
state due process claim was a matter of choice. In that case, the defendant argued to the
trial court "that the photo array was impermissibly suggestive under the federal Due
Process Clause." Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1111. lie could have argued the state due process
clause as well, but he chose not to. M. at 1113. Then, during his appeal, this Court
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issued State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), holding that Utah's due process
analysis is "as stringent as, if not more stringent than, the federal analysis," and diverging
from the federal analytical model for determining the "due process reliability of
eyewitness identifications." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. Ramirez might have strengthened
defendant's state due process argument, but it did not change the landscape on which
defendant relied. Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1113. With or without Ramirez, defendant knew
that he had to preserve his state due process claim if he wanted to argue it on appeal. IcL
Conversely, in State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), a case cited in
Candcdo's opening brief, exceptional circumstances existed because the defendant's
failure to preserve his claim for appeal was not a matter of choice but of reasonable
reliance on the law, as it existed at the time. ''At the time of the suppression hearing" in
that case, "the pretext doctrine was the controlling rule of Fourth Amendment law."
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1134 n.2. The defendant, therefore, "had no reason to argue that the
doctrine be adopted under article 1, section 14 [of the Utah Constitution] until the State
challenged the doctrine on appeal." Id.; sec also State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276, 1277
(Utah 1993) (per curiam) (holding that "Mailing to consider defendant's issue would
constitute manifest injustice" where this Court determined, after defendant was
convicted, "that Utah docs not recognize the crime" defendant was convicted of).
In this case, exceptional circumstances exist because Candcdo's failure to preserve
his due process claim was not a matter of choice, but of reasonable reliance on settled
law. See Pet'r Br. at 35-39. Before Wallace, the court of appeals' decisions in State v.
Robinson, 860 P.2d 979 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert, denied. 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994).
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and Slate v. McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, 110 P.3d 149, cert, denied, 124 P.3d 251 (Utah
2005), provided the controlling interpretation of the probation statute. That interpretation
raised no substantive due process concerns because it said that a trial court "exceeded its
statutory authority" if it imposed a probationary term longer than the 12- or 36-month
terms outlined in the probation statute. McDonald, 2005 UT App 86 at f||19; see
Robinson, 860 P.2d at 982 (holding that "Ihc maximum formal probation periods for. . .
a class B misdemeanor, and for... a class A misdemeanor, are respectively twelve
months and thirty-six months." (citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(8)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992))).
At sentencing. Candedo argued that the trial court did not have authority to impose
a 108-month probationary period. With McDonald and Robinson as controlling
precedent, this was the appropriate argument to make and the argument likely to prevail.
See McDonald, 2005 UT App 86 at in[20, 22 (ordering that "trial court's probation order
is hereby terminated as of February 26, 2004," the end of the statutorily-imposcd twelvemonth period). Candedo could not be expected to predict that this Court would overrule
McDonald and Robinson and reinterpret the probation statute to allow limitless
probationary terms. See Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at ^[13-14. Nor could he be expected to
predict the constitutional implications this Court's future decision would raise and to
present those implications to the trial court. Thus, denying him the opportunity to
challenge the legality of the trial court's probationary order under the new landscape
created by Wallace would result "in manifest injustice." Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29
at 1|23; see Ilaston, 846 P.2d at 1277.
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CONCLUSION
Candcdo respectfully asks this Court to reverse and remand for resentencing
because his sentence to serve a nine-year probationary period violates due process.
Candcdo asks this Court to reach the merits of his argument through either rule 22(e) of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure or the exceptional circumstances doctrine.
SUBMITTED this _ j ^ _ day of December, 2008.

cc^iS^^v^
LORI J. SEPPI
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner
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